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Port Authority In New York construction worker Caused Injuries To Plaintiff
Case: Plaintiff Christopher Graybill filed suit in New York Supreme Court against the City of New York and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey for injuries caused to him as a construction worker when, in cleaning debris from the site of the destroyed World Trade Center, a steel beam struck and injured him. Defendant Port Authority removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq., alleging that the case falls under Section 408(b)(3) of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001), which provides that the Southern District of New York shall have exclusive jurisdiction over claims “resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes” of September 11, 2001. On my suggestion, the parties briefed and argued the issue of federal jurisdiction, defendants in support of jurisdiction, and plaintiff in opposition.
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act Ten days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2002, Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (the “Air Safety Act” or the “Act”). As part of that legislation, Congress created a federal cause of action “for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes” and provided exclusive federal jurisdiction in the District Court for the Southern District of New York “over all actions resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes.” See Air Safety Act, §§ 408(b)(1) & 408(b)(3), respectively.
The Port Authority removed this action from state court on the basis of Section 408(b)(3). The question before me is whether this case was properly removed to federal court, that is, whether this case, alleging site-owners’ negligence under Sections 240 and 241(6) of the New York Labor Law, is nevertheless a case “resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes” of September 11 within the meaning of Section 408(b)(3) of the Air Safety Act.
Accidents at construction sites are common. Laborers work in confined spaces and under great pressures of time, using sophisticated machinery to excavate and erect heavy and unwieldy materials and necessarily depending on the alertness and competence of many others at the work-site, as well as on their own. Although the dangers and pressures of the WTC site may have been greater than most normal construction sites, there was neither argument nor allegation that the accident that resulted in plaintiff’s injury was unique to that site or that situation. The state of New York has extensive statutory and regulatory laws governing construction sites and the duties and obligations of site owners to assure safe conditions to the construction workers who toil on their property. New York state courts have developed an expertise in applying these rules to find and apportion liability for accidents of this kind. There is no suggestion in the text of the Air Safety Act, or its legislative history, that Congress intended to displace the traditional functioning of state laws and state adjudicatory bodies in this kind of dispute.
Conclusion For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, I hold that the construction injury of which plaintiff complains does not “result[] from or relat[e] to” the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 within the meaning of Section 408(b)(3) of the Air Safety Act. Removal of this case from state to federal court by defendant Port Authority on the basis of Section 408(b)(3) was therefore improper, and this case is hereby remanded to New York Supreme Court for further proceedings.
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